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This paper was prepared  for the Meeting  of the Inter-American  Dialogue's Project on Latin America's
Integrationintothe  World  Economy,  held  in Washington,  DConDecember  18-20,1991.  Itisto be formaly
published  by the  Inter-American  Dialogue  in a volume  edited  by Winston  Fritsch,  later in 1992.  Copies  of
this paper are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please
contact  Maureen  Colinet, room H3-063,  extension  37044  (June 1992,  31 pages).
In the last few years,  the countries  of Central  Mexico's entry  into the North American
America  have taken steps to stabilize  their  Free Trade Area (NAFTA)  could seriously  hann
economies  and to introduce  domestic  and trade  Central  American  interests  by diverting  trade and
reform  aimed at improving  resource  allocation  investment  from the region. To temporarily
and making  domestic  markets  more competitive.  protect  the Central  American  countries  from the
As the Central American governments move  unintended fallout of Mexico's  entry into
toward integrating  their  economies  into the  NAFTA,  Saborio and Michalopoulos  recom-
world  market, Saborio  and Michalopoulos  mend  the adoption  of an interim  provision  that
suggest  that they:  would  extend  to Central  America  any prefer-
ences  the U.S. grants  to others (beyond  those
C  Continue  to participate  fully  in the multilat-  already  provided  by the Caribbean  Basin Initia-
eral round of trade negotiations,  because  as  tive). Such  a provision,  effective  between  now
small,  open economies  they have a great stake  in  and, say, 1995,  would  provide  a mechanism  for
the health of the intemational  trading  system.  the transition  from unilateralism  to some type  of
reciprocity  in U.S. commercial  relations  with
e  Revitalize  the Central  American  Common  these countries.  During  this period, the countries
Market,  not as a sheltered  regional  market for  of Central  America  would continue  to undertake
inefficient  domestic  firms but as an expanded  the necessary  economic  and institutional  re-
base for regional  competitiveness  and for  forms  to enable  them to meet intemational
coordinating  policy  with the rest of the world.  competition  more effectively.
* Seek preferential  trade arrangements  with  While Central America  should do all it can
the United  States  and possibly  other countries  in  to get greater,  preferential,  and more  secure
the context of the Enterprise  for the Americas  access  for its products  - particularly  in the
Iitiative  (EAI),  it it serves  the larger  purpose  of  main, most dynamic  market for its nontraditional
liberalizing  trade  - but be leery of pardal,  exports  - it must recognize  that current  ob-
isolated agreements  that may divert  more trade  stacles  to export  growth are related  not only to
than they create.  extemal  market  opportunities,  but also to intemal
problems  that inhibit  export supply.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseniinates the findings of work under way in the  Bank. An objective of the series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Like  elsewhere  in  Latin  America,  profound  changes  in  economic
thinking  and  praxis  are  taking  place  in  Central  America  today.  Having  just
emerged  from  a long  period  of strife  and  decline,  Central  America  seems
determined  not  to  let  the  momentous  changes  happening  around  it  and  in  the
world  at  large  pass  it  by.  At  the  same  time,  though,  uncertainties  surrounding
the  evolution  of  the  international  environment,  apprehensions  about  increased
vulnerability  to  external  events,  and  the  misgivings  of  some  about  abandoning
the  sheltered  existence  of  the  past,  are  inhibiting  more  decisive  reforms.
This  paper  considers  the  challenges  and  opportunities  facing  the
Central  American  countries  and  explores  the  choices  open  to  them  for  fuller
integration  into  the  world  economy.  The paper  is structured  as follows:
Section  II  presents  a  brief  historical  account  of  the  origins  and  evolution
of  the  Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)  and  its  near  demise  in  the  1980s
and  highlights  the  thrust  of  these  countries'  trade  and  payments  policies  over
the  past  decade.  Section  III  presents  an  overview  of  the  pattern  and  trends
in  Central  America's  trade  relations  within  the  region  and  with  the  rest  of
the  world,  examines  prevailing  access  conditions  for  the  region's  exports  in
the  main  industrial  country  markets  and  explores  the  ways  in  which  three  major
developments  in  the  international  economy  -- the  Uruguay  Round,  EC-92  and  the
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement--  are  likely  to  affect  Central  America's
economic  interests.  Section  IV  analyses  the  options  open  to  the  region  as  it
seeks  greater  integration  into  the  world  economy  and  examines  the  domestic
policy  implications  of  such  an  outward-oriented  development  strategy.  Finally,
Section  V  contains  the  conclusions  and  policy  recommendations  of  the  paper.
II.  CENTRAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  1980s
A.  Background
The  establishment  of  the  Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)  in
1960  had  the  dual  purpose  of  fostering  industrial  development  and  reducing
these  countries'  extreme  dependence  on  the  export  of a handful  of  primary
commodities,  notably  coffee  and  bananas,  which  constituted  the  bulk  of  their
external  sales.  The  CACM  did  indeed  help  spur  industrial  growth  and  intra-
regional  trade.  The  share  of intra-regional  in  total  trade  rose  from  under
7.5%  to  25%  between  1960  and  1980,  and  it  consisted  mostly  of  manufactures
previously  imported  from  the  rest  of  the  world.The pattern  of industrialization  that evolved,  however,  was
essentially  inward-looking,  more  local  than  regional  in  character.'  Efforts
to  establish  large  scale  industries  to  serve  the  regional  market  were  largely
unsuccessful  because  it  was  politically  impossible  to  reach  agreement  on  where
such  "strategic"  units  should  be located.  Industrial  integration  was  also
discouraged  by  the  structure  of  the  Common  External  Tariff  (CET).  By  providing
higher  protection  for  consumer  goods  than  for  intermediate  and  capital  goods,
it fostered  the  establishment  of assembly-type  operations,  that  generated
little  local  value-added  and  were  highly  dependent  on  imported  inputs  from  the
rest  of  the  world.  To  make  matters  worse,  because  the  highest  tariffs  in  the
schedule  were  levied  on  luxury  goods  to  discourage  superfluous  consumption,
it  was  precisely  on  those  items  (e.g.  perfumes,  cosmetics),  where  the  greatest
incentives  for  import  substitution  were  unwittingly  created.
The  expansion  of  intra-regional  trade, particularly  in
manufactures,  did  make  CA's  overall  trade  pattern  more  diverse.  But  because
industry  was  import  intensive  and  inward  oriented,  it  became  a net  user  of
foreign  exchange.  As  a result,  industrial  activity,  employment  and  intra-
regional  trade  became  increasingly  dependent  on  the  foreign  exchange  generated
by  extra-regional  exports.  However,  the  same  incentives  that  favored  intra-
regional  trade  discouraged  the  expansion  and  diversification  of  extra-regional
exports,  which  continued  to  be  dominated  by  coffee  and  bananas.  Consequently,
the development  of the regional  market  not only  did not insulate  these
countries  from synchronous  shifts  in international  terms  of trade,  but
actually  made  economic  activity  in  the  region  much  more  vulnerable  to  such
disturbances.
In fact, the regional  economy  prospered  as long as the
international  economic  environment  was  relatively  benign  and  there  was  enough
foreign  credit  to  bridge  whatever  fiscal  or  trade  deficits  developed  without
having  to curtail  imports  from  within  or outside  the region. When  the
external  environment  took  a  marked  turn  for  the  worse,  as  it  did  in  the  late
1970s,  it  unleashed  a  chain  reaction  that  sent  the  regional  economies  on  a
tailspin.
B.  Onset  of  the  Crisis
The  crisis  that  exploded  in  the  region  in  the  early  1980s  was  as
much  political  as  economic  in  nature,  and  national  as  well  as  regional  in
scope.  While  its  underlying  causes  are  old  and  complex,  its  immediate  trigger
can  be  traced  to  the  sharp  deterioration  in  the  region's  terms  of  trade,  which
coupled  with  the  recession-induced  decline  in  demand  for  its  primary  exports
severely  curtailed  the  purchasing  power  of the  region's  exports;  and  the
unprecedented  rise in international  interest  rates,  which raised  debt
1/  Even in the heyday of the CACH (1970), fully 75% of industrial output
was absorbed domestically and only 16% was sold elsewhere in the region.  See
Willmore, Larry "La Promocion de Exportaciones y la Sustitucion de
Importaciones en la Industria Centroamericana", Revista de la Cepal, No. 38,
Agoeto de 1989, Pp.XXX.
3servicing  costs  precisely  when  export  earnings  were  declining.  Unable  to
secure  enough  external  credit  to  make  up for  the  shortfall  in  export  and
fiscal  revenues,  countries  throughout  the  region  were  forced  to  undertake
strong  expenditure-containment  measuras.  The simultaneous  contraction  of
economic  activity  in  these  countries  had  a  negative  multiplier  effect  on  the
regional  economy. At the same  time,  armed  conflict  in El Salvador  and
Nicaragua  and  political  unrest  elsewhere  began  to  -ar  the region  apart,
leaving  behind  a sequel  of  death,  destruction,  confusion  and  disarray  from
which  the  area  is  only  now  beginning  to  recover.
Partly  because  of  the  political  upheaval  enveloping  the  region,
there  was  no  concerted  response  to  the  crisis  by  regional  governments.  Each
country  confronted  its  problems  as  Dest  it  could. 2 In  retrospect  it  is  clear
that  these  divergent  responses  deepened  the  crisis  and  contributed  to  the
progressive  disintegration  of  the  region.
C.  Trade  and  Payments  Policies  in  the  1980s
Due  to  the  severity  of  the  payments  crisis  during  the  early  1980s,
the  overall  thrust  of  the  trade  and  payments  policies  throughout  the  area  was
to  constrain  import  growth.  Since  about  mid-decade,  though,  the  emphasis  in
most  countrtes  has  shifted  towards  the  promotion  of  non-traditional  exports
towards  markets  outside  the  CACM.
1.  Payments  Regime
Central  America  had  traditionally  been  a  low  inflation  area,  long
accustomed  to  fixed  nominal  exchange  rates.  Thus,  when  the  payments  crisis
struck  in  the  early  1980s,  instead  of adjusting  the  exchange  rate,  these
countries  resorted  to  all  sorts  of  exchange  controls  to  try  to  deal  with  the
external  imbalance.  The  reticence  to  devalue  and  the  imposition  of  exchange
controls  proved  very  counterproductive,  because  it  contributed  to  currency
speculation  and  capital  flight,  created  enormous  distortions  and  opportunities
for  corruption,  increased  transaction  costs  and  required  a  more  severe  fiscal
and  monetary  contraction  to  cope  with  the  balance  of  payments  problem.
Payments  policies  varied  considerably  from  country  to country.
Costa  Rica  was  the  first  (1983)  to  consolidate  its  foreign  exchange  market,
devalue  the  currency  and  establish  a  crawling  peg  tied  to  the  US  dollar  and
periodically  adjusted  by  inflation  differentials.  Guatemala  and  El  Salvador
maintained  multiple  exchange  rates  and  other  controls  until  1989,  when  they
consolidated  their  foreign  exchange  markets  and  established  a  managed  float;
Honduras  did so in 1990.  Nicaragua  is  a case  apart.  The  political  and
economic  dislocation  led to hyper-inflation  and  a total  debasing  of the
a/  For a detailed account of the process of economic reform in that period soe
Saborio, Sylvia "Central America" in Williamson, John (Ed.)  Latin American
Adjustment: How Much has Hap_ened?, Institute for International Economics,
Washington, D.C., April 1990.
4currency.  A  currency  reform  and  stabilization  program  have  only  recently  been
put  in  place.  A summary  of  the  main  macroeconomic  indicators  for  these
countries  during  the  1980s  is  presented  in  Table  1.
Such  disparate  responses  to  the  crisis  produced  wild  gyrations  in
real  exchange  rates  which,  coupled  with  the  web  of  restrictions  that  were  put
in  place  to  ration  foreign  exchange,  dealt  a  severe  blow  to  intra-regional
trade  flows.  Since  scarce  foreign  exchange  was  allocated  so  as to  favor
"essential"  imports  -- which  most  regional  products  decidedly  were  not--  such
imports  ended  up  bearing  the  brunt  of  the  restrictions.  The  situation  got  even
worse  with  the  progressive  weakening  and  eventual  collapse  (in  1986)  of  the
regional  payments  clearing9  mechanism  (Carmara  de  Compensacion  Centroamericana).
This  mechanism  was  used  to settle  outstanding  bilateral  balances  among
regional  partners  on a semi-annual  basis.  The  system  began  to fail  when
Nicaragua  started  to  accumulate  sizable  deficits  which  it  was  unable  pay  back.
Eventually,  regional  exchanqes  were  limited  to  cash  or  barter  terms  only.  As
a  result,  the  share  of  intra-regional  in  total  trade  plummetted  from  over  25%
in  1980  to  only  11%  in  1986.
2.  Import  Regime
The  common  external  tariff  (Arancel  Uniforme  Centroamericano)  and
the regional  system  of fiscal  incentives  (Convenio  Centroamericano  de
Incentivos  Fiscales)  had  been  the  lynchpin  of  both  import  and  industrial
policy  in  the  region  since  the  creation  of  the  CACM.  In  tne  early  1980s,
however,  measures  other  than  tariffs  became  the  main  policy  tools  to  effect
shifts  in  the  size  and  composition  of  imports.
In  addition  to  the  vast,array  of  exchange  controls  noted  above,
there  was  widespread  use  of  import  surcharges  and  prior  import  deposits,  not
only  to  curb  imports  but  also  to  generate  fiscal  revenues  (in  the  case  of
surcharges)  and  to  reduce  liquidity  (in  the  case  of  prior  deposits).  Even
though  their  effect  is  analogous  to  that  of  tariffs,  authorities  preferred  to
used  these  "disguised"  tariffs  because  they  could  do  so  without  technically
violating  the  common  tariff  schedule,  and  also,  because  in  some  cases,  it  was
the  only  form  of  taxation  that  did  not  require  a  lengthy  and  controversial
process  of  Congressional  ratification.  Quantitative  restrictions,  particularly
import  licensing,  were  also  resorted  to,  primarily  to  allocate  scarce  foreign
exchange  but  also  in  order  to  maintain  domestic  support  prices  for  a  handful
of  basic  agricultural  products. 3
In  1984,  as  part  of  its  adjustment  program,  Costa  Rica  initiated
a  campaign  to  revamp  the  region's  tariff  regime  which  culminated  in  the  first
comprehensive  reform  of  the  common  external  tariff  since  1969.  The  reform,
which  took  effect  1/1/86,  repealed  the  regional  system  of  fiscal  incentives;
3/  Quantitative restrictions have never been popular in Central America.
This has probably less to do with sound commercial policy than with the fact
that in a region of chronic fiscal deficits, quantitative restrictions are
considered an inferior form of protection, insofar as they generate private
rents rather than fiscal revenues.
5eliminated  all  specific  import  duties  and  other  levies,  replacing  them  with
ad  valorem  rates  in  the  common  tariff  schedule;  and  reduced  the  level  and  the
dispersion  of  nominal  tariff  rates.
The  average  nominal  tariff  was  lowered  by  about  50%  relative  to
the  ad  valorem  tariff  equivalent  existing  prior  to  the  reform.  (See  Table  2).
The  impact  on  effective  rates  of  protection  is  more  difficult  to  ascertain,
however,  given  the  large  number  of  exemptions,  exceptions  and  surcharges  to
which  imports  were  subjected  prior  to  the  reform.  Several  studies  reveal
that,  in  fact,  neither  the  structure  nor  the  level  of  effective  protection
changed  very  much  in  most  cases. 4 Apparently  the  reform  merely  eliminated
the  "water"  from  the  tariff  schedule.
Since  then,  unable  to agree  on a common  course  of action,
countries  have  followed  separate  paths  to trade  reform  under  structural
adjustment  programs  and  their  process  of  accession  to  the  GATT,  invoking
escape  clause  provisions  of  the  regional  accord.  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras
initiated  wide-ranging  trade  and  other  reforms,  supported  by World  Bank
structural  adjustment  lending,  in  1989.  More  recently  (1991),  El  Salvador  and
Nicaragua  also  undertook  similar  actions.  As  of  June  1991, tariffs  olus  other
duties  on  extra-regional  imports  ranged  from  a  narrow  band  of  5%-35%  in  El
Salvador  to  a  wide  band  of  5%-95%  in  Nicaragua.
With  the  lowering  of  political  tensions,  however,  a  marked  shift
towards  the  economic  re-integration  of  the  region  has  occured.  This  is  best
symbolized  by  the  series  of  commitments  to  buttress  the  regional  framework
undertaken  by  the  presidents  of  the  Central  American  countries  at  their  summit
meeting  in  San  Salvador  in  July,  1991. Among  other  measures,  they  agreed  to
revert  to a common  external  tariff  schedule  by end-1992.  With  few
exceptions 5, the  schedule  will  be  confined  to  a range  of  5%-20%  and  will
consist  of  four  basic  rates:  5%  on  non-competing  capital  and  intermediate
goods,  10%  on  competing  capital  and  intermediate  goods,  and  rates  of  15%  and
20% on non-competing  and competing  consumer  goods,  respectively.  The
presidents  also  called  for  the  removal  of  obstacles  to  intra-regional  trade
in  manufactures  and  vowed  to  liberalize  trade  in  agriculture  within  agreed-
upon  price  bands  by  mid-1992.  It  was  noteworthy  that  Honduras,  which  had
formally  withdrawn  from  the  CACM  in  1969,  agreed  to  rejoin  the  union  and  abide
by  the  proposed  timetable,  and  that  Panama,  which  has  never  been  part  of  the
CACM,  has  began  to  explore  the  possibility  of  eventual  participation  in  the
regional  scheme.
See World Bank, "Trade Liberalization and Economic Integration in
Central America."  Report No. 7625-CAM, Feb., 1990.
5/  The main exceptions are a time-limited exception from the 20% maximum
tariff for textiles and footwear in Costa Rica, to be phased out by 1994, and
the exclusion of a small number of "essential" and "fiscal" products from the
5%-20% bounds. See, La Declaracion de San Salvador, the joint presidential
statement issued at the San Salvador Summit, El Salvador, July 17, 1991.
63.  The  Export  Regime
The  ultimate  purpose  of  the  import  liberalization  measures  noted
above  was  to  reduce  the  anti-export  bias  of  these  economies  and  thereby
encourage  the  development  of  export  oriented  activities.  In addition,  a
variety  of export  promotion  schemes  and  incentives  were  put in place,
particularly  to  stimulate  non-traditional  exports  to  markets  outside  the  CACM.
A summary  description  of  the  three  basic  schemes  currently  in  existence  is
presented  in  Table  3.
The  experience  with  such  schemes  has  been  mixed.  Costa  Rica  has
been  by  far  the  most  successful  in  diversifying  its  export  structure:  over  the
last  7  years,  non-traditional  exports  have  been  growing  at  an  average  annual
rate  of  around  27%,  and  this  must  be  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  change  in
incentives  (including  the  management  of  the  exchange  rate).  The  fiscal  cost
of  the  program,  however,  has  been  very  high  and  continues  to spiral.  Tax
rebates  alone  currently  account  for  nearly  7%  of the  government  budget.
Moreover,  since  such  rebates  are  given  on  the  gross  value  of  exports,  only  a
fraction  of  the  money  actually  contributes  to  exports,  the  rest  subsidizes
imports  instead!  Indeed,  a  recent  study  by  the  IMF  found  that  the  direct  cost
of  the  subsidy,  not  counting  the  administrative  costs,  averaged  out  to  $2.27
per  $1  of  additional  net  exports.,
Thus,  even  if  these  countries  continue  to  pursue  an  outward-
oriented  strategy,  as  they  have  vowed  to  do,  a  mayor  task  before  them  will  be
to  redesign  the  instruments  of  their  export  drive,  putting  less  emphasis  on
fiscal  incentives  that  benefit  individual  exporters  and  more  on  measures  that
contribute  in  a more  direct  and  lasting  way  to improve  the  external  (and
internal)  competitiveness  of  the  economy  as  a  whole,  such  as  improvements  in
infrastructure  and  transportation,  export  finance,  customs  administration,
etc.
A separate  but  related  task  will  be  to  map  out  a strategy  to
respond  to  the  challenges  and  opportunities  presented  by  the  international
environmen,t,  particularly  those  related  to  the  Enterprise  for  the  Americas
Initiative  and  other  regional  preferential  agreements.
III.  THE  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMY:  CHALLENGES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES
Before  considering  the  options  and  implications  of  embracing  a
more  outward-oriented  policy  stance,  it  would  be  useful  to  highlight  the  main
features  of  Central  America's  trads  relations  and  review  how  they  might  be
affected  by  major  unfolding  developments  in  the  international  sphere,  notably
the  Uruguay  Round,  EC-92,  and  the  establishment  of  a  North  American  Free  Trade
Area  (NAFTA),  comprising  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  US.
6/  Hoffmaister, Alexander,  "The Cost of Export Subsidies: Evidence from
Costa Rica", IMF Working Paper, WP/91/94, October 1991, p.19.
7A.  Present  Trade  Profile
The U.S.  is both  the dominant  market  and  supplier  to CA,
accounting  in  each  case  for  around  43%  of  the  total.  Apart  from  absorbing  a
large  share  of  the  region's  traditional  exports  (some  60%  in  the  case  of
bananas,  40%  for  coffee),  the  U.S.  is  also  the  fastest  gruwirng  market  for  a
number  of  the  region's  non-traditional  exports,  particularly  clothing  and
textiles;  currently,  the  US  absorbs  over  55%  of  totai  CA  textile  and  apparel
exports.  For  its  part,  the  relative  importance  of  the  European  Community  as
a  trading  partner  has  remained  essentially  unchanged  over  the  last  decade:  the
EC  absorbs  around  20%  of  CA  exports  (mostly  coffee  and  bananas)  and  supplies
about  10%  of  CA  imports  (mostly  chemicals  and  transport  equipment).  Trade
with  Japan  and other  industrial  count"ies  is relatively  unimportant,
accounting  for  less  than  10%  of  the  total,  although  Japan  is  an  important
supplier  of  automobiles  to  the  region  (44%  of  the  total).  (Tables  4  &  5).
Trade  with  other  Latin  American  countries  is  generally  low,  except
for  oil  imports  supplied  mainly  by  Venezuela  and  Mexico.  On  the  whole,  Latin
America  purchases  around  6%  of  CA  exports  and  supplies  some  19%  of  its  imports
(including  fuel,  which  accounts  for  nearly  half  of  those  shipments).  Canada,
meanwhile,  supplies  only  around  1%  of  the  region's  imports  and  buys  about  3.5%
of  its  exports.
The  most  dramatic  shift  in  trade  patterns  has  occurred  within  the
region  itself.  After  having  risen  sharply  since  the  inception  of  the  CACM,
intra-regional  trade  fell  precipitously  in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms
in  the  1980s.  Between  1980  and  1986,  the  share  of  intra-regional  exports
dropped  from  over  25%  to  only  10%  of  the  total:  this  constitutes  a  fall  of  63%
in  the  dollar  value  of  such  exports.  Since  then,  intra-regional  exports  have
expanded,  but  in  1990  they  were  still  41%  below  their  1980  level.  Intra-
regional  imports  have,  likewise,  declined  in  absolute  and  relative  terms:  in
1990  their  dollar  value  was  35%  below  their  value  in  1980.  It  is  interesting
to  note  that  with  the  near  demise  of  the  CACM  in  the  1980s,  CA's  trade  flows
reverted  to  a  pattern  remarkably  similar  to  that  prevailing  25-30  years  ago.
As  far  as  the  commodity  composition  of  trade  is  concerned,  while
some  export  diversification  has  occurred  in  individual  countries  (notably
Costa  Rica  and  Guatemala),  the  region  as  a  whole  continues  to  depend  on  a
small  number  of  primary  commodity  exports  to  developed  country  markets  for  a
large  share  of  its  foreign  exchange  earnings.  Indeed,  throughout  the  1980s
the  structure  of exports  became  increasingly  concentrated  on traditional
products:  the  share  of  coffee  and  bananas  in  total  exports  rose  by  over  10
percentage  points  (to  nearly  55%  of  the  total),  while  exports  of  manufactures
declined  in both  absolute  and  relative  terms  during  the  decade,  as  the
collapse  of  intra-regional  trade  was  only  partly  offset  by  increases  in  sales
to  third  countries.  For  the  region  as  a  whole,  the  share  of  manufactures  in
total  exports  dropped  from  26%  to  only  20%  during  this  period.
The  structure  of  imports,  meanwhile,  has  remained  quite  stable
over  time:  capital  goods  and  intermediate  manufactures  make  up  some  2/3  of  the
total,  manufactured  consumer  goods  account  for  an  additional  14-16%,  food
8imports  amount  to  an  extra  11-12%  of  the  total,  and  the  balance  is  made  up  of
fuel  imports,  whose  share  fluctuates  with  movements  in  the  price  of  oil.
B.  Market  Access  Conditions  and  Prospects
Given  Central  America's  trade  patterns,  access  conditions  to  the
U.S.  and  EC  markets  are  critical  to  future  export  prospects.  Access  to  those
markets  will  be  affected  in  important  -- if  as  yet  uncertain--  ways,  by  three
major  developments:  the  Uruguay  Round,  EC-92  and  the  North  American  Free  Trade
Area  (NAFTA).  Following  a review  of present  access  conditions  to those
markets,  the  potential  impact  of  such  developments  on  future  market  access
will  be  considered.
1. The  Present  Situation
On  the  whole,  tariffs  in  industrial  markets  are  not  important
restraints  to  Central  American  exports.  In  the  U.S.,  for  instance,  the  average
trade-weighted  tariff  rate  (using  1986  trade  weights)  on  Central  American
exports  was  only  1.8%  in  1989.  ;:oreover,  nearly  80%  of  all  CA  exports  enter
the  U.S.  duty-free.  In  addition  to  duty  free  access  under  MFN  and  GSP,  these
countries  enjoy  duty-free  access  on  a  further  group  of  commodities  under  the
Caribbean  Basin  Economic  Recovery  Act  of  1983,  commonly  referred  to  as  the
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI).' Certain  sensitive  items  of export
interest  to  the  region,  however,  are  explicitly  excluded  from  duty  treatment
under  the  CBI  (i.e.  textile  and  apparel,  footwear,  leather  goods,  canned
tuna),  while  others  enjoy  duty  free  entry  subject  to  certain  restrictions
(i.e.  sugar,  ethanol  and  beef).  On  the  other  hand,  preferential  access  and
duty  treatment  is  given  to  exports  made  under  production  sharing  schemes  using
U.S.  components  (under  HTS  subheadings  9802.00.60  and  9802.80).  Special
provisions  apply  in  case  of  articles  made  entirely  of  US  made  materials,  the
net  effect  of  which  is  to  extend  duty  free  entry  and  guaranteed  access  to
products  otherwise  not  eligible  for  preferential  treatment,  such  as  apparel,
footwear,  leather  goods,  etc.  (See  Table  6.)
Tariffs  on  CA  imports  are  generally  low  in  the  EC  as  well.  About
30%  of  CA  exports  enter  the  EC  duty  free,  an  additional  7%  are  eligible  for
treatment  under  the  GSP,  and  another  46%  enter  at  a  duty  of  5%.8  Excise
duties  are,  however,  an  important  barrier  in  some  individual  markets,  e.g.,
there  is  a  40%  excise  tax  on  coffee  in  Germany.
Non-tariff  barriers  constitute  the  most  important  impediment  to
industrial  country  markets  for  CA  products.  NTBs  of  various  kinds  (including
7/  Nicaragua  has  been  excluded  from  this program. The original  program  was
established  in 1983  for  a period  of twelve  years.  It  was liberalized  slightly
and  made  permanent  in 1990.
A/  See  Marc Pierini,  "EC  Eyess  New Ties  in Central  America",  Europe,
November/December,  1984,  pp.30-31.
9health  and  safety  regulations  which  may  or  may  not  have  protective  intent)
affect  about  15%  of  total  CA  exports  to  the  US. However,  the  incidence  of
NTBs  is  very  high  on  certain  categories  of  goods.  For  example,  almost  70%  of
CA  exports  of  food  products  (other  than  coffee  and  bananas)  and  over  a  third
of  CA  exports  of  textile  and  apparel  to  the  US  market  are  subject  to  NTBs.
(See  Table  7). As  noted,  though,  the  U.S.  provides  additional  access  to  CBI
beneficiaries  through  the  establishment  of  guaranteed  access  levels  (GALs)  for
textiles  and  clothing  products  assembled  from  fabric  produced  and  cut  in  the
U.S.  In  the  case  of Costa  Rica  and  Guatemala,  these  arrangements  have
permitted  considerable  expansion  in  these  countries'  apparel  exports  to  the
U.S.
The  overall  incidence  of  EC-wide  NTBs  is  quite  small,  affecting
only  2%  of  CA  exports.  However,  NTBs  are  an  important  deterrent  in  the  case
of  food  products,  25%  of  which  face  hard  core  NTBs 9, and  in  the  case  of
textiles  and  apparel  exports,  where  over  20%  do  so.  Furthermore,  these  figures
understate  the  actual  incidence  of  NTBs  in  Europe,  since  they  do  not  reflect
restrictions  imposed  at  the  national  level  (such  as  quotas  on  bananas,  or  the
German  excise  duty  on  coffee).
The  incidence  of  trade  restrictions  on  individual  CA  countries
varies  due  to differences  in the  commodity  composition  and  geographic
distribution  of  their  trade  (See  Table  8). Costa  Rica  faces  higher  tariffs
and  NTBs  in  the  U.S.  market,  because  a  larger  share  of  its  exports  to  that
market  consists  of  non-traditional  agricultural  and  industrial  products  that
face  above  average  restraints.  On  the  other  hand,  Honduras  is  the  hardest  hit
by NTBs  in  Europe,  on  account  of  its  high  reliance  on  '.ananas  and  other  food
products  to  those  markets.
2. The  Impact  of  the  Uruguay  Round
Given  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  outcome  of  the  Uruguay
Round,  only  qualitative  judgements  about  the  potential  impact  on  Central
America's  trade  interests  of  various  issues  under  negotiation  can  be  ventured
at  this  point.'°
i/  Hard  Core  NTBs involve  quotas  or other  quantitative  restraints  including
voluntary  export  restraints,  reference  prices,  tariff  quotas,  and  variable
levies.  Total NTBs include, in addition, countervailing and antidumping
duties or investigations, safety and health regulations and other "technical"
restraints.
10/  For example, in the area of tariffs, CA countries would benefit from the
extension to them through the MFN principle of lower tariffs that may result
from the Round.  But these gains would be offset in part by the erosion of
preferences enjoyed under the GSP and the CBI. While these effects can not be
assessed quantitatively without knowing the outcome of the negotiations in
tariffs, it is likely that the effect would be small, since tariffs facing
their exports are on the whole quite low.
10In  tropical  products  and  especially  coffee  and  bananas,  the  main
potential  benefit  from  the  Round  could  result  from  reduction  in  excise  taxes
on coffee  in Germany  to the much lower  EC average,  and loosening  of
restrictions  on  banana  imports  from  non-ACP  countries.  It  is  unclear  at  this
point  whether  the  EC  would  be  prepared  to  introduce  these  measures  as  part  of
the  Round  or,  as  it  appears  more  likely,  modify  its  policies  as  part  of  EC-
1992  (see  below).
Regarding  other  agriculture,  the  effects  on  CA could  be quite
mixed.  On the  one hand,  these  countries  are  net importers  of temperate
foodstuffs  and  would  be adversely  affected  by an agreement  that  reduced
developed  country  subsidies  in  this  area. On  the  other  hand,  they  stand  to
benefit  handsomely  from  any  arrangement  that  reduced  the  level  of  protection
for  sugar  in  the  U.S.  and  EC  markets.  Changes  in  health  standards  could  also
yield  mixed  results.  To  the  extent  that  the  use  of  standards  with  protective
intent  (i.e.,  beef)  is  curbed,  CA  countries  stand  to  gain;  but  the  adoption
of  stricter  health  standards  in  other  cases  (i.e.,  shrimp)  may  hurt  CA  non-
traditional  exports.
The liberalization  of textile  trade  could  yield  significant
benefits  for  CA exporters  in the  long  term.  In the short  term,  however,
liberalization  of  the  MFA  may  result  in  losses  to  competitors  from  East  Asia
in  the  U.S.  market,  both  directly  and  through  the  dilution  of some  of  the
benefits  they  now  enjoy  through  the  CBI.  In  fact,  CA  textile  and  apparel
exporters  have  broken  ranks  with  the  International  Textile  and  Clothing  Bureau
(ITCB)  and  argued  for  a longer  phase-out  period  for  the  MFA  and interim
measures  to protect  their  market  share  from  larger  and  more established
competitors  in  Asia. 11
Finally,  to the  extent  that  these  countries  are  embracing  an
outward-oriented  strategy,  they have a  stake in the wellbeing  of the
international  trading  system.  They,  therefore,  stand  to  gain  from  improvements
in  the rules  of the system,  especially  regarding  the  mechanisms  for  the
settlement  of  disputes  and  the  use  of  trade  remedies,  such  as  anti-dumping,
countervailing  and  safeguards,  particularly  by  the  US  and  EC.  By  generating
uncertainty  about  future  access  to those  markets,  such  actions  inhibit
investment  in  the  export  sector  and  undermine  political  support  for  trade
liberalization.
3.  EC-1992
The  proposed  establishment  of  a  single  market  in  Europe  by  1992
aims  at  increasing  the  competitiveness  of  European  suppliers  by  eliminating
remaining  impediments  to  intra-European  commodity  and  factor  movements,  and
by  adopting  unified  rules  for  the  treatment  of  certain  imports  from  outside
the  EC,  previously  under  national  jurisdiction.  These  proposals  are  expected
to  result  in  increases  in  efficiency  and  income,  which  would  have  potentially
positive  effects  on third  countries,  including  those  in Central  America.
11/  Scott  Norvell,  "Central  American  Textile  Firms  Back  Slower  GATT
Transition",  Journal  of  Commerce,  Nov.  13,  1991.
11Against  this,  there  would  be  some  trade  diversion,  resulting  from  shifts  away
from  third  country  suppliers  to  the  EC  due  to  its  enhanced  competitiveness.
Given  the  relatively  weak  trade  links  between  CA  and  the  EC,  the  income  effect
of  EC-92  on  CA  is  projected  to  be  small.  According  to  one  estimate,  for  every
1%  of  extra  GNP  growth  in  the  EC,  GNP  in  Latin  America  as  a  whole  could  be
expected  to  rise  by  0.2%."
Most  trade  creation  will  occur  in  the  case  of  primary  commodities
not  produced  in  the  EC  or  by  ACP  beneficiaries,  while  most  trade  diversion  can
be  expected  in  manufactures.  As  noted  above,  the  main  benefit  for  Central
America  could  result  from  actions  to  reduce  the  high  excise  duties  on  coffee
in  Germany  and  from  possible  erosion  of  ACP  preferences  in  bananas.  On  the
other  hand,  tightening  of  EC  health  standards  could  affect  adversely  CA  non-
traditional  agricultural  or fishery  exports.  Of greater  concern  are  the
multitude  of  preferential  arrangements  currently  in  place  in  the  EC,  including
those  to  the  ACP  countries,  the  recently  extended  preferences  to  the  Andean
Group 13, and  those  likely  to  be  established  with  countries  in  Eastern  Europe.
In  addition,  there  is  the  danger  that  the  EC  would  decide  to  use  Community-
wide  quotas  or  other  protective  devices  such  as  anti-dumping,  in  lieu  of  the
previous  national  quotas,  to  prevent  expansion  of  CA  exports  in  sensitive
sectors.
In  sum,  while  EC  growth  can  be  expected  to  provide  some  stimulus
to  CA  exports,  there  is  little  that  the  CA  countries  can  reasonably  expect  in
the  form  of  improved  opportunities  for  export  expansion  in  the  EC  market  --
other  than  for  coffee  and  bananas  and  a  few  other  traditional  exports.
4. North  America  Free  Trade  Area
The  establishment  of  a  North  American  Free  Trade  Area  encompassing
the  US,  Mexico  and  Canada,  poses  some  thorny  questions  for  Central  America.
As the  first  step  in  the  process  of  consolidating  a hemispheric-wide  free
trade  area,  it  conjures  up  dizzying  visions  of  the  potential  of  a  mega-market
of 730  million  people  with  a  combined  GDP  of  $6.7  trillion.  On the  other
hand,  the  NAFTA  poses  some  serious  immediate  threats  and  future  challenges  to
Central  America. In  the  first  place,  given  that  Mexico  is  a  competitor  on
practically  all  items  exported  by  CA  to  the  US,  the  inclusion  of  Mexico  in
NAFTA  would  result  in  the  erosion  of  some  of  the  preferences  these  countries
12/  Sheila Page, "Some Implications of Europe 1992 for Developing
Countries", ODI, December, 1990.
13/  In late 1990, the EC granted a four year reprieve on customs duties for
imports from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador as a reward for their anti-
drug policies. As a result, these countries now enjoy a margin of preference
of up to 22% in EC markets over their CA competitors on a number of products,
including coffee, seafood, cut flowers, plants and some foodstuffs. Costa
Rica, Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, San Jose, (mimeo).  UPDATE: As of
1/1/92, the EC agreed to extend essentially the same privileges to Central
America.
12currently  enjoy  in  terms  of access  to the  U.S.  market  under  the  CBI.  In
addition,  Mexico  may  obtain  preferential  access  to  the  North  America  market
for  products  such  as  textiles  and  apparel,  which  are  excluded  from  the  CBI.
This  would  leave  CA  (and  others)  with  negative  preferences  on  those  items  in
the  US  market.
Recent  estimates  indicate  that, next to Brazil,  CA would
experience  the largest  amount  of trade  diversion  from  the preferential
elimination  of  tariffs  on  Mexican  goods  entering  the  U.S.  market  --  nearly  20%
of  the  total  trade  displacement  for  the  whole  of  Latin  America. 14 While  this
effect  is  currently  small  relative  to the  amount  of trade  involved,  the
potential  for  trade  displacement  would  grow  over  time,  as new investment
decisions  (and hence future  trade flows)  would reflect  the shift in
preferential  access  to  the  US  market  in  favor  of  Mexican  exports  implied  by
NAFTA.
Indeed,  investment  diversion  is  potentially  a  more  serious  problem
for  Central  America  than  trade  diversion  per  se.  Even  with  preferential  access
to  the  US  market  and  generous  incentives  for  investment  in  export-oriented
activities,  these  countries  have  had  a  hard  enough  time  attracting  foreign
direct  investment  from  the  US and  elsewhere' 5 . With  Mexico  now  becoming  a
springboard  for  unrestricted  entry  into  the  US  and  Canadian  markets,  whatever
locational  advantage  Central  America  had  as  an  investment  site  to  serve  the
North  American  market  will disappear.  To be placed  at such  competitive
disadvantage  at a time  of global  capital  scarcity,  is a matter  of great
concern  to  the  region.  Such  concern  is  well  justified.  Already,  before  the
NAFTA  is  even  concluded,  anecdotal  evidence  is  beginning  to  accummulate  of
firms  relocating  to  Mexico  or  changing  their  investment  plans  so  as  to be
advantageously  positioned  by  the  time  the  deal  is  struck"  . Such  imminent,
though  unintended,  fallout  from  NAFTA  creates  a strong  incentive  -- and a
strong  case--  for the countries  of Central  America  to seek to obtain
assurances  from  the  U.S.  that  their  access  to  its  market  would  be  at  least  as
favorable  as  that  to  be  provided  to  Mexico.
In  conclusion,  the  Uruguay  Round  and  policy  modifications  related
to  EC  1992  are  likely  to  offer  some  modest  opportunities  to  CA  countries  for
enhanced  market  access,  especially  regarding  primary  commodities,  whereas  the
14/  Refik Erzan and Alexander Yeats, "Free Trade Agreements with the United
States: What's in it for Latin America?" in Sylvia Saborio, ed., U.S. - Latin
America Trade Relations in the 1990s, ODC (forthcoming).  The calculation
assumes that whatever NTBs may exist would be relaxed so as to let the full
effect of the tariff reduction play out.
IS/  USITC Annual Report on the Impact of Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act on U.S. Industries and Consumers.  Sixth Report, 1990, Washington, D.C.,
Sept., 1991.
16/  FEDEPRICAP, "A Central American Private Sector Perspective on Some of
the Main Issues as Regards NAFTA and the Formation of an FTA between CA and
the US", Nov. 21, 1991.
13NAFTA  is  likely  to  entail  trade  and  investment  diversion  from  the  area.  On  the
whole,  though,  what  emerges  from  the analysis  is  that  at present,  access
barriers  to the region's  exports  are not very  high,  except  for certain
categories  of  products  which  currently  represent  a  relatively  small  (though
growing)  share  of  the  total.  As  the  "export  bundle"  of  these  countries  shifts,
however,  they  will  encounter  increasing  obstacles  to  tneir  exports.  Moreover,
their export  interests  will be adversely  affected  by the erosion  of
preferences,  particularly  in the case  of NAFTA,  but also  on account  of
preferences  extended  by  the  EC  to  the  Andean  Group,  and  the  recent  extension
of  CBI  benefits  to  those  same  countries  by  the  US. 17
IV. MEETING  THE  CHALLENGE:  CATCHING  THE  FREE  TRADE  EXPRESS
Given  the  evolving  external  environment,  how  should  the  Central
American  countries  react  to  the  challenges  and  opportunities  before  them?  What
role should  the CACM play in the future  development  strategy  of these
countries?  Should  other  regional  arrangements  (beyond  the  CACM)  be  pursued?
Finally,  what  are  the  basic  domestic  policy  requirements  for  the  success  of
the  chosen  strategy?
A.  Strategic  Choices  Regarding  the  External  Environment
Small  countries  such  as  those  of  Central  America,  have  no  choice
in terms  of long  term  growth,  except  to adopt  an outward  looking  trade
strategy.  Options  do  exist,  however,  as  to  the  way  in  which  such  a  strategy
can  be  pursued  in  different  international  settings,  particularly  with  a  view
to  mitigating  the  transition  costs  and  the  degree  of  external  vulnerability
associated  with  a  more  open  trade  policy.
Fundamentally,  the  choice  boils  down  to  whether  trade  ought  to  be
liberalized  multilaterally,  or  in the  context  of  some preferential
arrangement.  Economic  analysis  indicates  that  from  the  standpoint  of  world
welfare,  non-preferential  multilateral  liberalization,  is almost  always  a
first  best  alternative  compared  to  the  formation  of  preferential  Free  Trade
Areas  (FTAs).  This  does  not  imply,  however,  that  members  of  a  preferential
FTA  do not  stand  to  gain  from  it,  or even  that  both  policies  need  to be
mutually  exclusive.  In  fact,  we will  argue  that  the  countries  of Central
America  should  pursue  such  a "hybrid"  strategy  with  the  ultimate  goal  of
becoming  better  integrated  into  the  world  economy  at  large.
What  we propose  is  a three-pronged  approach.  As GATT  members,
these  countries  should  continue  to  participate  in  the  Uruguay  Round,  reaping
as  many  benefits  as  can  be  had,  assuming  as  much  of  the  responsibilities  as
possible,  and  using  the  GATT  as  a  vehicle  to  move  foreward  the  domestic  reform
17/  The "Andean Trade Preferences Act" thats extends CBI privileges to
Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in  recognition of their anti-drug efforts,
was signed into law on December 4, 1991.
14agenda.  At  the  same  time,  they  should  take  steps  to  revamp  and  breathe  new
life into the CACM. Finally,  they should pursue  preferential  trade
arrangements  with  the  US  and  possibly  others  as  well,  in  the  context  of  the
Enterprise  for  the  Americas  Initiative.
B.  The  Role  of  the  CACM
The  traditional  notion  of  the  CACM  as  an  alternative  to  greater
integration  in  the  world  market  is  essentially  dead.  In  our  view,  the  CACM
could  still  usefully  play  a  dual  role:  as  a  vehicle  to  expand  the  regional
export  base,  thereby  facilitating  the  internationalization  of  these  economies,
and  as  a  framework  for  policy  co-ordination  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of  the  world.
In  order  to play  this  dual  role,  the  CACM  itself  needs  to  be
revitalized.  To  this  end,  all  remaining  cross-border  barriers  and  exchange
restrictions  affecting  trade  in  regionally  produced  manufactures  need  to  be
removed.  The  liberalization  of  intra-regional  trade  in  agriculture,  following
the  adoption  of  a  common  price-based  mechanism  for  the  treatment  of  extra-
regional  imports,  has  already  been  agreed  to  and  should  be  in  place  by  mid-
1992.  Beyond  the  removal  of  barriers,  per  se,  the  restoration  of  the  clearing
arrangement  for  regional  payments  will  be  crucial  for  the  reactivation  of
intra-regional  trade.  In  order  to  avoid  recreating  the  circumstances  that  led
to  the  collapse  of  the  previous  arrangement,  however,  individual  countries
will  need  to  pursue  macroeconomic  and  exchange  rate  policies  that  prevent
serious  disequilibria  from  developing  and  exerting  pressure  on  either  intra-
regional  or  extra-regional  payments.  The  shift  towards  more  market-oriented
policies  by  each  of  these  countries  over  the  last  few  years  should  help  ensure
such  convergence  by  relying  more  on  market  forces  than  on  negotiated  solutions
to  attain  that  objective.
As  far  as  Central  America's  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world
are  concerned,  the  commitment  to  revert  as  of  1992  to  a  common  external  tariff
schedule  -- which  is  also  simpler,  more  transparent,  and  confers  much  lower
levels  of  effective  protection  to regional  industry--  is  a very  important
development,  for  it  signals  that  the  process  of  regional  consolidation  will
not  be,  in  fact,  an  inward-oriented  one.  This  raises  the  question  of  the  role
of  regional  cooperation  within  an  outward-oriented  strategy.
There  are  a  number  of  areas  in  which  regional  cooperation  could
enhance  the  external  competitiveness  of  these  countries  by  pooling  resources,
reducing  unit  costs and avoiding  duplication.  For instance,  they could
establish  joint  commercial  offices,  issue  joint visas,  establish  joint
inspection  and quality  control  centers,  set up joint  market  information
networks  and  distribution  channels,  undertake  joint  manpower  training,  etc.
They  could  also  go  a  step  further  and  merge  the  various  national  airlines  into
a regional  carrier,  integrate  capital  markets  on  a  regional  scale  to  reduce
the cost of financial  intermediation,  and seek to expand  the region's
technological  base  through  joint  R & D,  so  as  to eventually  transcend  the
limitations  of  the  maquila.  In  addition,  they  should  seek  to  harmonize  their
policies  -- in  areas such as taxation,  investment,  export promotion,
15intellectual  property  rights--  so  as  to  avoid  creating  unnecesary  (and  often
unintended)  distortions  in  the  allocation  of  resources  region-wide.
Finally,  the CACM should  provide  the framework  for policy
coordination  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of  the  world.  Essencially,  what  is  required
is  that  these  countries  agree  on  the  basic  parameters  for  trade  reform  beyond
1994  and adopt  a united  stance  with  respect  to the  myriad  proposals  for
preferential  regional  trade  arrangements  that  have  sprang  up  ever  since  the
Enterprise  for  the  Americas  Initiative  was  launched  by  President  Bush  in  mid-
1990.
C.  Other  Regional  Arrangements
From  the  standpoint  of  individual  countries,  the  calculus  of  the
costs  and  benefits  associated  with an FTA  will  depend  very  much  on the
particular  trade relations  that exist  between  a given  country  and its
potential  trade  partners.  Specifically,  the  benefits  from  an FTA  would  be
higher:  (a)  the  greater  the  importance  of  the  partner  as  a market  for  the
country's  exports;  (b)  the  higher  the  level  of  protection  in  the  partner's
market  for  the  country's  exports  prior  to  the  FTA;  and  (c)  the  greater  the
proportion  of imports  supplied  by  the  potential  partner  before  the  creation
of  the  FTA.
On  the  basis  of  these  criter  a,  there  would  be  an  incentive  for
CA  countries  to  seek  a  free  trade  arrangement  with  the  U.S.  (or  NAFTA).  The
US is  the  largest  and  most  dynamic  market  for  the  region's  exports.  The  US
(together  with  Canada  and  Mexico) already  absorbs  nearly  half  of  CA  total
exports,  and  an even  larger  share  of its  non-traditional  agricultural  and
industrial  exports.  At  the  same  time,  the  U.S.  is  an  important  supplier  of
imports  to  these  countries  even  without  the  benefit  of  preferences  in  their
markets.  This  suggests  that  the  cost  in  terms  of  trade  diversion  of  granting
preferences  to the U.S.  would  be small,  with  the possible  exception  of
automobiles,  where  the  potential  for  displacement  of  Japanese  imports  seems
significant.
In  terms  of  expanded  access  to  the  US  market,  though,  the  static
gains  from  an  FTA  would  be  rather  slim,  given  that  existing  barriers  to  that
market  are  generally  low  and  that  80%  of  the  region's  exports  already  enter
the  US  duty  free.  Recent  estimates  suggest  that  the  preferential  elimination
of  all  US  tariffs  on  CA's  exports  would  boost  such  exports  by  less  than  8%
(16.5%  in  the  case  of  Costa  Rica,  which  currently  faces  the  highest  access
barriers). 18 Still,  it  is  a fact  that  the  sectors  most  heavily  protected  in
the  US  market  are  precisely  those  activities  in  which  CA  countries  are  trying
to  diversify.  The  preferential  elimination  of  such  barriers  (both  tariffs  and
NTBs) would,  therefore,  enhance  the  potential  for  future  exports  of  those
commodities.
18/  See Erzan and Yeats (1991).  This assumes that existing NTBs are relaxed
concommitantly so as to allow the full effect of the tariff to play out.
16Another  advantage  of  an  FTA  is  its  contractual  nature,  i.e.  it
would  lock-in  conditions  for access  to the  US market  that  could  not be
unilaterally  modified  by  the US without appropriate  procedures  and
compensation,  as  is  the  case  with  unilateral  preferences  granted  under  the  CBI
and  GSP.  This  is  important,  because  CA's  ability  to  take  advantage  of  such
market  opening  will  critically  depend  on  the  expansion  of  its  export  capacity,
and  without  assurances  of continued  access  to the  US market,  it  would  be
difficult  to attract  the investment  necessary  to bring  this  about.  This
argument  cuts  both  ways,  however.  Since  an  FTA  is  a  reciprocal  arrangement,
it  would  also  impose  additional  obligations  on  Central  America,  not  only  in
terms  of  liberalizing  its  own  trade  regime,  but  in  such  areas  as  investment
services,  intellectual  property  protection,  state  trading,  subsidies,  etc.,b
While  reforms  in  many  of  these  areas  are  underway  and  are  consistent  with  the
avowed  objective  of seeking  fuller  integration  of CA in  the  international
economy,  the  economic  (and  political)  costs  of such  domestic  adjustments
should  not  be  taken  lightly.
In  the  end,  the  most  compelling  reason  for  CA  to  seek  a  free  trade
agreement  with  the  US  is  a  defensive  one.  While  these  countries  might  have
prefered  to  remain  essentially  free  riders,  enjoying  unilateral  though  limited
preferences  in  the  US  market,  the  entry  of  Mexico  (and  possibly  others)  into
NAFTA  leaves  them  no  option  but  to  seek  to  join  the  FTA  as  well.  Otherwise,
their competitive  position  vis-a-vis  Mexico  in the US market  would  be
undermined  and  they  would  also  face  a  competitive  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  the
US  in  the  Mexican  market.  The  cost  of  exclusion  from  the  FTA  would  thus  be
high,  and  it  would  rise  with  each  new  entrant  to  the  preferential  arrangement.
Central  American  countries,  therefore,  have  an  incentive  not  only  to  join  the
FTA,  but  to  do  so  as  soon  as  possible,  not  merely  to  avoid  the  cost  of  trade
diversion,  but  to  reap  some  of  the  investment  benefits  of being  among  the
first  to  join  the  FTA.
Reaching  a full-fledged  FTA  between  the  US  and  the  countries  of
Central  America  in  the  near  future  is  a practical  impossibility,  given  that
the  US  refuses  to  contemplate  further  agreements  until  the  NAFTA  is  concluded
and  assessed,  that  there  are  a  number  of  other  candidates,  and  that  Central
America  is  not  ready  to  fully  liberalize  trade  at  this  time.  For  this  reason,
we propose  an interim  arrangement,  whereby  the countries  of CA would  be
temporarily  protected  from  the unintended  fallout  of Mexico's  entry  into
NAFTA,  while  they  carry  on  their  economic  reforms  and  become  ready  to  assume
reciprocal  obligations  under  an  FTA.  (See  below.)
Aside from the US  initiative,  a  number  of proposals  for
preferential  trade  arrangements  have  been  put  forth  by  other  countries  in  the
region,  notably  Mexico,  Venezuela,  Colombia,  and  CARICOM. Is it in the
interest  of  Central  America  to  enter  into  preferential  trade  arrangements  with
these  countries?  According  to  the  criteria  laid  out  above,  on  purely  economic
grounds  there  would  be little  to be  gained  by CA entering  into  separate
19/  See Carla A. Hills, Toward a Dynamic New Era of Growth, statement at the
Central American Conference on Trade and Investment, San Jose, Costa Rica,
August 12, 1991.
17agreements  with  these  countries.  First,  because  trade  links  between  CA  and
each  of these  countries  have  traditionally  been  very  weak  (except  for  oil
imports  from  Venezuela  and  Mexico).  And  second,  because  while  most  of  them  had
highly  protected  markets  in the  past,  over  the  last  few  years  they  have
unilaterally  reduced  very  substantially  their  level  of  protection  so  that  the
potential  margin  of  preference  in  those  markets  is  by  now  relatively  small.
Thus,  even  though  the  Mexican  and  Venezuelan  proposals  embody  the  concept  of
"relative  reciprocity",  whereby  Central  American  exports  would  enjoy  freer
access  to their  maikets  than  they  would  expect  in  return  for  a number  of
years,  these  proposals  on  their  own  are  unlikely  to  amount  to  much.
When  looked  at  from  a  broader  perspective,  however,  the  set  of
proposals  make  more sense,  for they suggest  the formation  of a "Grand
Caribbean  Basin"  region.  If  and  when  trade  were  liberalized  in  a  preferential
but consistent  manner  among  these  countries,  the region  could  become  a
building  block  for  the  larger  vision  of  a  hemispheric  free  trade  area.  As  a
means  to that  larger  goal,  such  a development  would  have  the virtue  of
exposing  countries  to  rising  levels  of  external  competition,  of  maintaining
the  momentum  for  trade  liberalization,  and  of eventually  facilitating  an
agreement  between  the  US  and  a  large  group  of  small  countries  that  even  in  the
aggregate  would  be  of  only  marginal  economic  interest  to  the  US.
D.  Domestic  Policy  Implications  of  Trade  Liberalization
In  terms  of its implications  for  domestic  policy,  it  matters
little  whether  the economies  of Central  America  liberalize  their  trade
multilaterally  or  in  the  context  of  an  FTA  with  the  US:  either  way  they  would
be exposed  to the rigors  of international  competition  and  would  need  to
exercise  great  discipline  in  the  management  of  macroeconomic  policy.
Significant  changes  in  the  competitive  environment  will  require
in  many  cases  a  fundamental  reorientation  in  the  attitude  of  firms  previously
operating  in  a  sheltered  market.  Profitability  would  tend  to  depend  more  on
efficiency  and  less  on  securing  rents  through  administrative  intervention  or
protection,  whether  they  produce  for  the  domestic  market  or  for  export.  This
is  likely  to  entail  significant  adjustment  costs.  Considering  the  upheavals
these  economies  went  through  during  the  1980s,  it  is  possible  that  the  most
vulnerable  firms  will  have  already  disappeared  and  those  that  remain  should
be able  to handle  higher  levels  of competition  within  a generally  more
p.  opitious  economic  environment.  Nevertheless,  competitive  pressures  will
increase  as  trade  barriers  are  progressively  eliminated,  so  that  additional
displacement  of inefficient  firms  appears  inevitable.
A parallel  expansion  in  exports  will  be  needed  to  absorb  labor
displaced  from  the  import  competing  sector.  Indeed,  in  the  face  of severe
limitations  in  these  countries'  capacity  to  assume  additional  debt,  export
growth  will  become  an  increasingly  important  determinant  of  their  ability  to
adjust  and  grow.  Their  participation  in  an  FTA,  however,  would  likely  limit
their  use  of  particular  export  promotion  instruments  such  as  export  subsidies
which  had  been  extensively  used  in  the  past. Government  support  for  exports
18would  still  be  needed,  but  it  should  be  geared  to improving  export  support
activities,  such  as infrastructure,  cutting  red  tape,  and,  most  important,
providing  a  healthy  macroeconomic  environment,  all  of  which  are  essential  for
a  vigorous  export  supply  response.
Experience  has  shown  that  the  success  of  trade  reform  hinges  on
macroeconomic  stability. 
2 0 Achieving  such  stability  will  be a daunting
challenge  for  these  countries.  Fiscal  deficits  in  several  of  them  are  already
at  unsustainable  levels  and  need  to  be  reduced.  Trade  liberalization,  however,
is likely  to have  an adverse  impact  on their  budgets,  both  by reducing
revenues  and increasing  expenditures. Currently,  import  duties  alone
represent  20  to  40%  of  total  tax  revenues  in  these  countries.  Deep  tariff
cuts  are  likely  to  lead  to  a  net  decline  in  fiscal  revenues,  even  if  account
is taken  of a parallel  reduction  in export  subsidies,  exemptions,  and in
contraband  imports.  Moreover,  a commitment  to  a liberalized  trade  regime
implies  the  need  to  rely  on  exchange  rate  adjustment  rather  than  on  direct
trade  and  foreign  exchange  controls  to  maintain  external  balance.  In  order  to
avoid  a deterioration  of the  external  accounts  as a result  of the import
liberalization,  it  may  well  be  necessary  to  undertake  a  compensating  nominal
devaluation.  The  latter,  however,  would  exacerbate  the  fiscal  problem  as  it
would  increase  the  local  currency  cost  of  servicing  the  large  external  debt
obligations  of  these  countries.
Thus,  trade  reform  in Central  America  cannot  succeed  in the
absence  of comprehensive  tax  and  fiscal  reform. Governments  will  need  to
revamp  their  tax  system  to  secure  additional  fiscal  revenues.  Tax  reforms  in
other  developing  countries  have  typically  focused  on  the  introduction  of  VAT
as  well  as  more  effective  collection  of  other  existing  taxes. If  a  VAT  or  a
similar  system  were  to  be  introduced  however,  it  would  need  to  be  harmonized
across  countries;  otherwise,  it would lead to distortions  in resource
allocation  within  the  region  by  creating  artificial  incentives  for  locating
investment  in  the  countries  with  the  lowest  tax  rates.
In sum,  significant  trade  liberalization  would  require  major
changes  in  the  domestic  economy,  both  at  the  micro  and  macroeconomic  level.
For  firms,  changes  are  needed  in  incentives  and  attitudes.  At  the  macro  level,
changes  are  needed  in  policies  and  institutions,  especially  in  the  fiscal
system.  Such  changes  will  take  some  time  to  implement.  But  unless  they  are
undertaken,  full  trade  liberalization  will  not  be  sustainable.
V.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  Over  the  last  few  years,  the  countries  of  Central  America
have  taken  steps  to  stabilize  their  economies  and  to  introduce  domestic  and
trade reforms aimed at improving  resource  allocation  and increasing
competition  in  their  domestic  markets.  While  a  lot  remains  to  be  done,  their
governments  remain  committed  to moving  forward  towards  integrating  their
20/  V. Thomas,  Kazi  Matin  and  J. Nash,  "Lessons  in Trade  Policy  Reform",
Policy  & Research  Series  No.10,  World  Bank,  March  1990.
19economies  more  fully  into  thIe  world  market.  We  have  suggested  that  in  doing
so  they  should  follow  a  three-pronged  approach:
*  continue  to  participate  fully  in  the  multilateral  round  of  trade
negotiations,  because  as  small  open  economies,  they  have  a  great  stake  in  the
health  of  the  international  trading  system.
*  revitalize  the  CACM,  not  as  a sheltered  regional  market  for
inefficient  domestic  firms,  but  as  an  expanded  base  to  enhance  the  external
competitiveness  of  the  regional  economies,  and  as  a  framework  for  coordinating
policy  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  is  imperative  that  these  small
economies  take  a  united  stand  on  matters  of  mutual  interest  to  enhance  their
economic  weight  and  negotiating  position.
*  seek  preferential  trade  arrangements  with  the  US,  and  possibly
others,  in  the  context  of the  EAI,  if it serves  the  larger  purpose  of
liberalizing  trade  on a broad  basis,  but  be leery  of partial,  isolated
agreements  that  may  divert  more  trade  than  they  create.
2.  Mexico's  entry  into  NAFTA  could  seriously  harm  the  economic
interests  of Central  Central  by diverting  trade  and  investment  from  the
region.  Unlike  others  in  the  Caribbean  Basin  who  enjoy  preferences  in  the  EC
markets  under  the  Lome  Convention,  and  in the  Canadian  market  through
Caribcan,  the  attraction  of  Central  America  as  an  investment  site  rests  almost
exclusively  on  its  preferential  access  to  the  US  market.  With  Mexico  as  a
springboard  for  unrestricted  entry  into  the  US  and  Canadian  markets,  whatever
locational  advantage  Central  America  had  as  an  investment  site  to  serve  the
North  American  market  will  be  significantly  reduced.
These  countries  can  ill  afford  to  see  their  access  to  the  U.S.
market  curtailed  at  the  very  time  that  they  themselves  are  embarking  on  an
important  trade  liberalization  effort,  nor  can  they  afford  to  lose  potential
investment  inflows  as  they  set  out  to  reconstruct  their  war-torn  and  crisis-
battered  economies  and  hone  them  to  meet  the  challenges  of international
competition.  After  all,  the  premise  behind  the  promise  of  trade  liberalization
as an engine  of growth  is that  as inefficient  industries  succumb  to
competitive  pressure,  new  export  activities  will  replace  them.  For  this  to
materialize,  however,  plenty  new  investment  will  be  needed.
The  problem  is  that  while  the  threat  of  trade  and  investment
diversion  is imminent  -- indeed,  the latter  is already  happening  in
anticipation  of  a  successful  NAFTA--  the  US  is  not  willing  and  the  Central
American  countries  are  not  ready  to  avert  such  a  threat  by  entering  into  a
full-fledged  FTA  any  time  soon.
In  order  to  bridge  that  time  gap,  we  recommend  that  an  interim
provision  be  adopted  (either  as  part  of  NAFTA  itself  or  as  a  separate  bill),
whereby  any  preferences  granted  by  the  US  to  others  (beyond  those  provided  by
the  CBI)  between  now  and  1995,  say,  be  extended  to  Central  America  as  well.
During  this  period,  the  countries  of  Central  America  would  continue  their
economic  reform  process  according  to  existing  commitments  under  agreements
with  the  World  Bank,  the  IMF,  GATT,  USAID,  etc.,  whose  compliance  could  be
20monitored  through  the  Framework  Trade  and  Investment  Agreements  already  in
place  between  the  US  and  each  of  these  countries.  By  1995,  the  countries  of
Central  America  would  be  in  a  position  to  assume  additional  obligations  under
a  reciprocal  arrangement  with  the  US.  By  then  also,  if  adjustment  to  the  NAFTA
has  occured  smoothly,  the  political  climate  in  the  US  may  be  more  amenable  to
completing  the  vision  of  a  hemisphere-wide  free  trade  area.  While  the  proposed
interim  measure  is  independent  of  whether  or  not  the  NAFTA  agreement  contains
an  accession  clause,  such  a clause  would  clearly  facilitate  the  eventual
transition  to  a  full-fledged  FTA.
Such  an approach  would  temporarily  protect  the  countries  of
Central  America  from  the  unintended  fallout  of  Mexico's  entry  into  NAFTA,
while  at  the  same  time  providing  a  mechanism  for  the  eventual  transition  from
unilateralism  to  some  type  of  reciprocity  in  U.S.  commercial  relations  with
these  countries.  It  would  cost  the  US  virtually  nothing,  since  these  countries
account  for  only  about  1%  of  total  US  imports,  and  80%  of  that  is  already
duty-free.  Yet,  it  would  give  these  countries  both  a  strong  incentive  and  a
fighting  chance  to  sustain  the  process  of  trade  and  economic  reform  which  they
have  undertaken.
3.  While  Central  America  should  do  all  it  can  to  obtain  larger,
preferential  and  more  secure  access  for  its  products  -- particularly  in  the
main  and  most  dynamic  market  for  its  non-  traditional  exports--  it  must
recognize  that,  at  present,  the  main  obstacles  to  export  growth  are  to  be
found  on  the  supply,  not  the  demand,  side.  Red  tape,  perverse  incentives,
inefficient  financial  intermediation,  deficient  transportation,  inadequate
infrastructure,  insufficient  market  information,  defective  quality  control--
all  contribute  to  hold  back  export  growth,  regardless  of  how  many  market
opportunities  there  might  be. All  Central  American  countries  have,  to a
smaller  or  larger  extent,  initiated  significant  reforms  to  address  many  of
these  problems.  Their  total  elimination,  however,  is  a  gigantic  task  that
will  require  vision,  perseverance  and  political  courage  to  complete.
Indeed,  developing  an  export  culture  in  these  countries  is  bound
to  be  a  long,  drawn-out  process,  that  will  require  major  adjustments  on  the
way  both  governments  and  entrepreneurs  go  about  their  business.  The  former
must  be  prepared  to  exercise  much  more  discipline  in  their  own  affairs  than
in  the  past,  and  must  devise  means  to steer  and  support  the  process  of
transformation  that  are  efficient,  equitable  and  fiscally  sound.  The  latter,
in  turn,  must  learn  to  succeed  through  the  pursuit  of  excellence  rather  than
the  securing  of  sheltered  markets  and  fiscal  rents.  Tough  lessons,  indeed.
Yet,  such  are  the  demands  of  the  brave  new  world  of  international  competition
these  countries  are  seeking  to  join.
21Table  1
CENTRAL  AMERICA:  BASIC  MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS
1979-83  1984-88  1989-90
Gross  Domestic  Product
(average  annual  rate  of  change)
Costa  Rica  -0.2  4.6  4.6
El  Salvador  -4.8  1.7  1.8
Guatemala  0.6  1.4  4.0
Honduras  1.0  3.9  1.2
Nicaragua  -2.5  -3.1  -4.0
Public  Sector  Deficit  (%  of  GDP)
(average  of  annual  figures)
Costa  Rica  12.4  5.4  5.9
El  Salvador  7.7  4.2  5.3
Guatemala  4.3  4.0  4.4a
Honduras  9.4  7.9  8.1
Nicaragua  18.0  42.3  31.4a
Current  Account  Balance  of  Payments  (%  of  GOP)
(average  of  annual  figures)
Costa  Rica  -12.7  -4.3  -7.5
El  Salvador  -1.7  1.2  -2.6
Guatemala  -3.8  -4.5  -6.2
Honduras  -9.6  -5.3  -7.3
Nicaragua  -15.5  -19.1  ...
Consumer  Prices
(average  annual  rate  of  change)
Costa  Rica  37.4  15.3  17.5
El  Salvador  13.8  22.1  20.1
Guatemala  9.0  16.6  25.7
Honduras  11.4  3.9  16.2
Nicaragua  32.7  3,232.9  6,850.0
Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate
(average  of  annual  figures,  index  1979=100)
Costa  Rica  85.9  81.8  86.0
El  Salvador  120.7  151.3  155.0
Guatemala  106.1  82.8  62.7a
Honduras  112.2  121.2  72.6
Nicaragua  135.5  356.4  236.28
Terms  of  Trade
(average  of  annual  figures,  index  1979=100)
Costa  Rica  93.3  113.6  102.5
El  Salvador  80.6  82.3  71.68
Guatemala  93.0  93.6  80.2a
Honduras  95.0  96.0  89.3
Nicaragua  97.5  100.0  101.1l
a  1989.
Source:  International  Monetary  FundTable  2
CENTRAL  AMERICA:  EXTERNAL  LEGAL  TARIFF
(percentages)
Pre-reform  Average  Legal
Average  Tariff,  Tariff,  1987  1991 Range  1993  Range  1995  Range
Costa  Rica  52  26"  10  -50b  5  - 30  5  - 20
El  Salvador  48  23  5  - 35  5  - 25  5  - 20
Guatemala  50  25  5  37c  5  - 20  5  - 20
Honduras  41  20  4 35d  5  - 20  5  - 20
Nicaragua  54  21  5  - 200  5  - 20  5  - 29
SOURCES:  "Politicas  Industriales  en  Centroamerica  y Panama",  ECLAC,  LC/MEX/R.310,  August  5, 1991;  World  Bank,  Trade Liberalization  and  Economic  Integration  in  Central  America,  Report  No.  7625-CAM,  1990,  p.  29  and  32;  Ministry  of  Economy,
Industry  and  Comerce,  Costa  Rica.
Ad  valorem  equivalent  of  the  average  external  tariff  before  the  reform.
a  Includes  surcharges.
b  Excludes  a  temporary  surcharge  of  2%  and  a  levy  of  1%  on  extra-regional  imports.  The  Central  Bank  of  Costa  Rica  also
requires  prior  import  deposits,  currently  30%  of  the  CIF  value  of  the  imports.
a  Excludes  a  surcharge  of  3%  on  extra-regional  imports.
d  Excludes  a  general  surcharge  of  5%  and  an  additional  10%  on  final  products.  The  surcharges  cover  all  imports,  but
Central  America  will  be  exempt  as  of  1992.
*  Excludes  a  stamp  tax  of  3%  and  selective  consumption  taxes  of  up  to  75%  that  act  as  import  tariffs.  Such  taxes  will
be  reduced  gradually  to  15%.Table 3
CENTRAL AMERICAs  EXPORT  PROMOTION  SCHEMES
costs  1km  El Sabsads  Guatemla  Hduas  N1  1aa
FBtKI TRADE  ZONES
Tsx exenstioas
Machiy  and  intr  edat  imports  100%  '  100%  10D%  100%
Plofits  100%  8  years  100%  10  years  100%  12  years  100%
50%  4 years  exteadible
LIinaid  a  sd  Up to 40%  No limit  Up  to 20%  No limit  *wha
suliject  to  subject  to  subject  to  there  is  no  iomi
appoval  apoval  apro  production  of the
same',  subect  to
DRAWBACK INDUSTRIS
Tax Exmodons
Machinery  ad  nemediae impots  100%  10D%  100%  100%
Profits  100%  b  100%  10  years  100%  10  years  100%  10  yeas
Lcl  market sles  no  No limit  No limit  no
subject  to  wih payment  of
approval  c  oodng  Maes
Elxuort  leni;ves  no  Boeus of 8%  no  no
of value-
added
NON-TADIIONAL  EXPORT INCENTIVES
Tax exemilions
Macinery  and  intmedie  imports  100%  - 100%  100%  100%
Profits  100%'  - 100% 10years  100% 10yeus  80%
Export taxes  - 2%  1%
Tax Rebates  Up to 12%  - --  - 15%  of the
of the FOB value  FOB salne'
Cab Bonus  - K%  of the
FOB value
Re  uiremens  35% minimum  - - G  ae  Expt
national  value-  t least  at least
added  25 direct  25% of
jobs  prouto
Sore:  Polhitas lodusuia  de  oamenca  j  hasma'. ECLAC  LCMEXI310,  August  5, 1991.
'Nony  tie  re no reictons  for impots  to itb  zone, but rw  maters  io  iaeediawe  impoms  may be  sictd  if  the Ministy of Idstry  dearminsa  t  local  products an me  tne price, quality  and  delivery  condtions
requited  by the  impont  firms.
' In tbe cse  of regited  foreip  invstments, a  lx  of 15% is cbarged  wheai  ing the profits.
e In the case of regis  forega investmeats,  a tax of 15%  is charged  wben repuritn  the profits.
'Decins  each year and disears  in 1997.
* Declines  to 10% in 1993, 5% in 1995  and dispears  in 1997.
Note:  The figpr  for  Nia  a are  from the proposd  'Ley de  Promocion  de Exportecion'  whicb has  not  yet been  approved.Table  4
CENTRAL  AMERICA'S  EXPORTS  BY MAJOR  COODITY  AND  MAJOR  PARTNER  REGIONS
........  .................. ,..........._....  .....
NORTH  AMERICA  OTHER  AMERtCA  REST  OF THE WORLD
..............................  .....................  . ..................  .....................  .........................  ................
OTHER  LATIN
WORLD  CENTRAL  AMERICA  &  OTHER
COMMODITY  YEAR  (1,000  US O)  USA  CANADA  MEXICO  TOTAL  AMERICA  CAR1BBEAN  EEC 9  JAPAN  DEVELOPED OTHER
TOTAL
SITC 0  THRU  9(REV.1)
SITC 0 THRU  9  -971(REV.2)
1965  749495  37.0  0.5  0.0  37.6  17.8  1.3  23.4  14.0  2.3  3.7
1970  1094187  34.7  0.5  0.2  35.4  26.2  2.3  22.2  7.6  3.4  3.0
1975  2295653  32.5  0.9  0.9  34.2  23.4  3.8  24.0  7.0  3.2  4.3
1980  4464982  35.7  0.4  0.6  36.7  25.4  3.4  23.0  3.1  3.3  5.1
1985  3500527  37.5  1.3  0.6  39.5  15.5  4.6  21.6  5.2  4.0  9.6
1986  3873284  43.9  1.4  0.4  45.6  10.7  4.8  25.3  5.1  4.0  4.4
1987  3669902  42.1  1.6  0.4  44.1  14.1  4.6  23.7  3.6  4.6  5.3
DOT  1988  3902420  37.3  3.3  0.9  41.5  14.1  4.2  23.5  4.1  5.4  7.3
DOT  1989  4429069  41.0  3.9  1.2  46.1  14.8  4.7  20.6  3.8  4.8  5.3
DOT  1990  4555327  43.0  3.4  1.4  47.8  14.6  4.5  21.5  3.2  4.1  4.4
.... _................................................................................................................................
FRUITS & NUTS, FRESH  & DRIED
SITC 051+052(REV.1)
SITC 057(REV.2)
1965  87427  83.0  0.7  0.0  83.7  1.8  0.5  13.1  0.0  0.6  0.2
1970  156526  62.1  0.2  0.0  62.3  1.4  0.0  28.4  7.3  0.6  0.0
1975  232257  70.5  0.1  0.0  70.6  0.9  0.2  26.8  0.1  0.5  0.9
1980  535107  62.3  0.0  0.0  62.3  3.1  0.4  31.6  0.0  1.3  1.2
1985  586435  63.2  0.0  0.0  63.2  1.1  0.0  32.1  0.0  1.2  2.4
1986  627375  63.8  0.0  0.0  63.9  1.3  0.0  30.2  0.1  0.7  3.9
1987  762725  60.1  0.0  0.0  60.2  1.0  0.0  31.8  0.0  3.9  3.2
,....................................................................................................................................
BANANAS,PLANTA  INS FRESH
SITC 0513  (REV.1)
SITC 0S73 (REV.2)
1965  85863  84.1  0.7  0.0  84.9  0.8  0.5  13.0  0.0  0.6  0.2
1970  154564  62.6  0.2  0.0  62.8  0.9  0.0  28.4  7.4  0.6  0.0
1975  229144  70.8  0.1  0.0  71.0  0.6  0.2  27.0  0.1  0.5  1.0
1980  508448  63.3  0.0  0.0  63.3  1.4  0.3  32.4  0.0  1.3  1.3
1985  563199  63.1  0.0  0.0  63.1  0.5  0.0  32.7  0.0  1.2  2.5
1986  594493  63.9  0.0  0.0  64.0  0.4  0.0  30.8  0.1  0.7  4.0




1965  283756  50.7  1.0  0.0  51.7  0.2  G.0  40.8  0.7  4.4  2.2
1970  347279  36.3  1.4  0.0  37.6  0.1  0.0  47.2  1.1  9.2  4.9
1975  543747  33.3  0.6  0.0  33.9  0.1  0.1  51.5  4.3  8.0  2.0
1980  1365796  40.7  1.0  0.0  41.8  0.0  0.2  43.0  5.3  7.7  1.9
1985  1326271  33.7  1.7  0.0  35.4  0.0  0.6  32.7  6.6  8.5  16.0
1986  1843525  41.6  1.8  0.0  43.4  0.1  0.7  38.6  8.0  7.3  2.0
1987  1222012  41.0  2.8  0.0  43.8  0.0  0.3  37.3  6.7  7.0  4.8
...................................................................................................................................Table  4,  page  2
CENTRAL  AMERI`  A S EXPORTS  BY  MAJOR  C14MODITY  AND  M4AJOR  PARTNER  REGIONS
NORTH  -AMERrCA  XtTHER  :ASERWCA  'KEST  OF THE  WIORLD
.____.............__.....  _ .....................................  _............  ................................
OTHER  LATIN
WORLD  CENTRAL  AMERICA  &  OTHER
CC6IODiTY  YEAR  (1,000 US  S1  USA  CANADA MEXICO  TOTAL  AMERtCA  CARIBBEAN EEC  9  JAPAN  DEVELOPED  OTHER
OTHER  FOOD  PRODUCTS
SITC  0-051-052-071te+22+44REV.t)
SITC 0-057-071+1+22*4(REV.2)
1965  105247  42.3-  0.0  0.0  42.4  38.6  3.3  5.7  9.4  0.3  0.3
1970  205736  64.6  0.0  0.4  65.1  29.7  0.8  3.3  0.&  0.2  0.2
1975  -597711  55.1  2.2  0.0  57.3  14.5  2.4  19.4  1.1  0.6  4.4
1980  807021  68.6  0.2  0.3  69.1  20.5  2.3  3.3  1.3  0.4  3.2
1985  529400  65.8  2.4  2.2  70.3  14.0  4.3  4.2  1.4  0.5  5.4
1986  576490  56.9  3.1  0.1  60.1  12.2  8.3  4.6  1.8  0.6  12.4
1987  591646  54.9  3.1  0.1  58.2  16.9  4.6  5.0  1.1  0.6  13.6
..........................................  ...  ...................................................................................................................................................... _  .................
OTHER  PRIMARY  PLUS  METALS  & MINERALS
SITC 2-22068
1965  181915  7.8  0.2  0.0  8.0  3.2  1.9  22.7  50.9  1.7  11.6
1970  141987  11.7  0.1  0.1  11.9  5.0  7.7  18.8  .46.6  2.6  7.4
1975  383395  12.3  0.1  0.9  13.3  4.0  7.0  22.3.  34.1  6.3  13.0
1980  574520  7.9  0.4  1.2  9.6  5.9  2.9  37.9  9.5  5.1  29.1
1985  372375  9.8  0.5  1.3  11.6  7.2  7.2  26.3  e3.0  4.3  20.4
1986  205250  17.2  0.1  3.0  20.3  9.2  12.7  21.9  19.9  5.0  11.0
1987  244562  25.6  0.1  5.0  30.7  12.3  10.4  20.2  17.0  3.8  5.6
..  ...............................................................................................................................
CLOTHING  & TEXTILES
SITC 65+84
1965  23986  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.7  98.6  0.6  o.b  0.0  0.0  0.0
1970  68092  2.0  0.0  0.1  2.1  96.5  -0.8  0.3  . 0.0  0.1  0.2
1975  119282  8.0  1.6  0.1  9.6  84.9  1.5  2.5  0.2  0.7  0.6
1980  259239  5.9  0.1  0.1  6.1  85.7  4.2  3.6  0.1  0.3  0.1
1985  113486  30.9  1.4  0.1  32.4  55.9  5.9  5.4  0.1  0.1  0.2
1986  107145  53.2  1.7  0.1  55.0  35.1  6.6  1.9  0.0  0.1  1.4
1987  146281  55.0  1.8  0.2  57.0  36.5  3.2  3.1  0.0  0.1  0.2




1965  63469  3.5  0.1  0.1  3.6  90.6  3.2  0.7  0.0  1.5  0.3
1970  165895  3.0  0.0  0.5  3.5  89.4  5.3  0.6  0.3  0.2  0.6
1975  398531  3.5  0.1  4.2  7.8  80.4  8.4  1.1  0.1  0.2  2.0
1980  867215  8.3  0.1  1.8  10.2  77.1  10.1  2.0  0.1  0.2  0.3
1985  517638  11.7  1.2  1.2  14.0  68.9  15.5  1.2  0.0  0.2  0.2
1986  461086  18.2  0.1  1.8  20.1  S9.2  18.1  1.3  0.1  0.4  0.8
1987  545856  18.1  0.4  0.5  19.1  59.1  18.9  1.5  0.1  0.6  0.7
..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......  ...........  . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . ...  . . . . . . .
Source:  Comtrade  data base, United  Nations -data,  International  Computing  Center,  Geneva.
1987  and 1988  data are based on SITC, revision  2.
DOT:  Direction  of Trade Statistics, IMF.Table  5
CENTRAL  AMERICA'S  IMPORTS  BY MAJOR  COIWQOITY  AND  MAJOR  PARTNER  REGIONS
:;;;;::::;;v:g~~~~~.*:.  :;  .. ;.;  _  e;;..  .. ,....  _  ..  .,....  S...
NOliI  ANER1CA  o11M  AME1RICA  RfST  OF THE WORLD
.w;  . .,  ......................  ........  ...  .......  __.........  ......... _.__.......  -.  ------ ___
OTHER  LATIN
WORL0  CENTRAL  AMERICA  &  OTHER
CHOMOITY  YEAR  (1,000  us  S)  USA  CANADA  MEXICO  TOTAL  AMERICA  CARIBBEAN  EEC 9  JAPAN  DEVELOPED OTHER
. .-.  …  …  ……  n...  ................................ …-
TOTAL  -
SITC O tHRU 9MRMV.1--
SITC  O THRU  9  -97(RM.2)*
1965  890247  40.4  2.3  1.5  44.2  15.2  6.6  21.8  7.6  3.0  1.6
1970  1233067  35.5  1.3  2.0  38.8  24.3  5.4  18.7  9.0  2.9  1.0
1975  2945746  34.6  1.5  2.8  38.9  17.6  15.0  15.6  7.9  3.3  1.7
1980  6021981  33.0  1.6  3.7  38.3  18.3  20.0  10.7  7.8  3.0  1.9
1985  5439554  27.0  1.1  13.0  41.1  10.6  17.3  11.3  5.3  4.0  10.4
1986  4634877  31.7  1.5  6.6  39.7  10.0  14.0  13.3  6.4  4.9  11.7
1987  S598351  31.2  1.7  6.7  39.6  11.1  12.7  16.8  7.0  5.8  7.0
DOT  1988  5551505  36.8  1.6  6.5  44.9  10.2  12.5  13.9  6.0  4.2  8.3
DOT  1989  6324269  38.4  1.3  6.6  46.4  10.4  12.9  12.6  6.2  4.5  6.9




1965  108223  34.7  10.5  1.1  46.3  37.9  1.5  11.5  0.2  1.3  1.3
1970  140486  35.8  1.6  1.2  38.7  47.3  2.8  9.0  0.3  1.2  0.6
1975  307269  50.5  1.4  1.0  S2.9  30.6  4.7  8.9  0.2  1.6  1.0
1980  669500  47.3  1.1  0.7  49.1  31.2  6.2  10.4  0.6  2.0  0.5
1985  561750  48.3  1.6  0.5  50.5  20.8  7.4  12.2  0.3  1.7  7.2
1986  502803  45.8  2.7  0.6  49.1  17.4  6.2  15.8  0.1  1.7  9.6
1987  600600  48.3  1.6  2.1  51.9  17.9  6.7  16.6  0.2  4.3  2.3
,,,,,,..................  . . . . . . . . ..  . ,  . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . _  ..  . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . .
OTHER  PRIMARY  PLUS METALS  & MINERALS
SITC 2-22+68
1965  18991  39.0  4.6  1.3  44.9  25.6  2.9  14.0  2.9  3.3  6.4
1970  37238  41.0  3.9  5.1  50.0  22.1  2.8  12.2  7.1  1.1  4.7
1975  76033  34.7  6.9  5.8  47.4  22.8  5.4  1O.5  8.3  3.3  2.3
1980  181618  43.6  9.2  5.6  58.4  16.6  6.6  7.2  4.8  2.7  3.6
1985  144750  36.6  5.3  11.2  53.1  15.4  12.1  8.2  1.9  3.0  6.2
1986  201175  39.6  5.4  7.7  52.7  11.4  9.8  10.4  1.2  2.5  12.1




1965  49363  18.2  0.0  0.2  18.4  7.0  73.3  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.1
1970  50473  18.3  0.0  0.2  18.5  3.8  76.1  0.7  0.5  0.1.  0.3
1975  369696  4.4  0.0  0.1  4.4  1.7  93.0  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.3
1980  1132826  4.1  0.0  6.4  10.5  2.0  86.8  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.3
1985  1479913  7.5  0.0  39.2  46.7  0.6  39.7  0.5  0.1  0.0  12.5
1986  764600  19.1  0.1  22.7  41.8  0.4  39.3  1.9  0.2  0.1  16.3
1987  670588  18.9  0.1  19.8  38.8  5.8  49.6  2.6  0.2  0.0  3.0
I...................................................................................................................................Table 5, page 2.
CENTRAL  AMERICA'S  IMPpRTS  BY MAJOR  COMMODITY  AND  MAJOR  PARTNER  REGIONS
NORTH  AMERICA  gTggR AMERICA  RESt OF tI$  WgRLp
..............  ..-...  ....--  ......  .
OTHER  LATtN
WORLD  CENTRAL  AMERICA  &  OTHER
COMMODITY  YEAR  (1,000  US 5)  USA  CANADA  MEXICO  TOTAL  AMERICA  CARI8BEAN  EEC 9  JAPAN  DEVELOPED OTHER
..............................  7  . .7.  . - - r  . ...  !T-  .... 7...  .T.-.  f  ..........
CHEMICALS
SITC S
1963 :  149928  42.4  0.9  2.7  46.0  14.1  7.6  28.1  0.6  3.1  0.4
1970  215465  31.4  0.9  4.0  36.4  24.8  4.6  26.2  3.0  4.2  0.7
1975  58784  32.4  0.7  5.4  38.5  20.0  5.1  25.5  3.4  5.2  2.3
1980  1096738  42.0  0.8  5.3  48.3  22.3  4.6  18.0  1.0  5.1  0.8
1985  1054295  33.3  0.8  4.8  38.9  14.7  8.1  23.3  1.2  8.0  5.7
1986  998734  33.1  1.2  4.8  39.1  13.3  8.3  23.6  1.7  8.8  5.2
1987  1146948  32.2  1.9  5.6  39.7  13.4  4.2  26.6  1.6  9.6  5.0
BASIC & MISCELLANEOUS  MANUFACTURES
SITC 6-68+8+9(REV.1)
SITC 6-68+8+9-971(REV.2)
1965  308486  . 36.1  1.6  1.9  39.6  19.4  1.9  19.8  13.5  2.9  3.0
1970  453293  30.6  1.9  1.7  34.3  33.4  1.9  14.4  11.5  3.1  1.4
1975  805438  31.6  2.9  2.6  37.2  31.0  2.8  12.9  10.8  2.7  2.7
1980  1649794  33.9  3.0  2.5  39.4  32.2  3.8  9.7  8.9  2.6  3.5
1985  1176037  29.9  2.3  3.2  35.4  20.8  11.3  10.2  7.1  4.1  11.1
1986  1103682  28.2  2.2  4.0  34.5  17.2  11.5  10.4  7.2  5.2  13.9
1987  1373355  27.8  2.2  5.5  35.5  18.7  10.8  12.0  5.5  5.4  12.0
....  ....  ...  .....  .....  ....  .......  ......  ..........  ...  ..  ..............  ...  ..  ..................  .......
MACHINERY  & EQUIPMENT
StTC 7-732  (REV. 1)
SITC 7-781-782-783-754  (REV. 2)
1965  183964  52.1  0.9  1.1  54.1  2.6  1.4  27.5  8.6  5.1  0.7
1970  241298  51.8  0.7  1.4  54.0  6.8  1.6  25.0  8.6  3.4  0.7
1975  601815  52.3  1.1  2.7  56.1  5.3  3.4  22.0  6.6  5.1  1.5
1980  963460  46.7  1.3  2.6  50.7  6.2  4.0  18.0  12.4  5.8  2.9
1985  775919  37.3  1.0  2.2  40.4  3.7  7.4  17.8  9.5  7.9  13.4
1986  765276  39.6  0.7  1.9  42.2  3.1  8.2  16.4  10.1  7.7  12.4
1987  1112501  35.0  1.6  2.6  39.2  3.0  6.4  26.0  9.2  8.1  8.1
..............................................................  .................................................................................................................  .......
MOTOR  VEHICLES
SITC 732  (REV.1)
SITC 781 THRU  784 (REV2)
1965  71291  49.6  0.3  0.2  50.0  0.5  0.3  34.1  12.4  2.4  0.2
1970  94814  33.1  0.1  0.4  33.5  1.3  0.4  33.0  29.4  2.3  0.1
1975  197647  30.7  0.4  2.5  33.6  1.4  3.1  17.6  39.8  4.0  - 0.4
1980  328045  23.6  0.4  2.4  26.3  0.9  4.8  8.0  55.2  2.0  2.9
1985  246890  16.9  0.1  1.2  18.3  1.0  6.7  9.2  45.0  4.4  15.4
1986  298606  23.5  0.2  1.5  25.3  0.8  7.6  8.9  40.3  2.5  14.6
1987  439160  25.3  0.2  3.i  28.7  0.3  7.6  9.8  43.6  3.9  6.2
...  ..  . ......  ...  ...--.  .........  ...  --................  ......  .........  . .......  .........  ...  ...  ..  ..  .........................
Source:  Comtrade  data base, United  Nations data, International  Computing  Center, Geneva.
1987  data is based on SITC, revision 2.
DOT:  Direction of Trade Statistics,  IME.Table  6
U.S.  Imorts  under  CoERA  by  Duty  Treatent and Country
(Value  in  millions  of  dollars)
Costa  RIca  Guatmala  El  Salvador  Honduras 1989  1990  1989  1990  1989  1990  1989  1990
Total  Imports  968  1,007  608  791  244  238  468  486
Dutiable  Value  200  220  136  194  43  60  65  64
HTS.9802  90  148  38  59  14  19  18  22
Other  Dutiable  110  72  97  135  29  41  37  42
Duty freo  Value  768  785  476  596  201  177  402  422
MFN  297  261  294  345  131  107  279  269
CBERA  193  218  116  154  28  28  53  68
GSP  90  93  24  38  13  8  20  19
HTS.9802  188  218  42  59  30  33  50  66
Source:  USITC,  U.S. Department  of  Commerce.
Note:  Totals  may  not  add up due  to  different  data bases.Table 7
Percentas  Sha.r  of  CACM  EXPOrte
Facina Non-Tariff  Barriers  In  OECD  Mrke-te.  1989
(By Co  todltY  GroU)
U.S.  EC.  Jaspan  Canada
Commodity  Groups
Fruits  and Nuts  2.8  3.7  n.a.**  n  & **
Coffee  0.0  0.0  n.a.  na.
Other  Food  Products  89.2  26.1  na.  n.e.
Other  Primary  ncl.
Metals  A Minorals  11.3  0.6  n.s.  na.
Clothing  A Textiles  38.0  21.6  na.  n.a.
Other  Manufactures  6.0  0.4  n.s.  n.a.
All  Goods  16.0  2.0  82.3  89.4
of  which:
Hard  Core  NTBs  . 7.1  1.8  0.9  1.8
_  These  involv,  quotas  or  other  quantitative  restraints  of  various  kinds,
including  voluntary  export  rostraints,  tariff  quotas,  reference  prices
and  variable  levies.
oc  Not  available.
Source:  UNCTAD  Data  Base  on  Trade  Control  Measures.Table  8
Percentage  Share  of  CACU  Export.
Facing  Mon-Tarift  barrieor  in OECD Markets.  1960
(By  Country
U.S.  E.C.  Japan  Canada
Costa RICa  28.2  1.2  93.7  98.1
(of  which
Hard Coro NThs)  (10.9)  (1.1)  (0.1)  (0.4)
El Salvador  7.0  0.2  91.8  98.9
(of which
Hard Core NTBa)  (6.2)  (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.1)
Guatom la  11.4  1.4  82.6  99.2
(of  which
Hard Core NT.)  (8.1)  (0.8)  (0.0)  (0.6)
Honduras  11.6  6.6  98.8  93.9
(of which
Hard Core NTBs)  (1.8)  (6.1)  (2.3)  (0.1)
Nicaragua  2.4  1.6  38.7  43.1
(of which
Hard Core NTBs)  (O °0)  (1.)  (0.2)  (10.1)
All Countries
(Weighted Average)  15.0  2.0  82.8  89.4
(of which
Hard Core NTB.)  (7.1)  (1.8)  (0.9)  (1.8)
a  For a definition, see Table 7 and Footnote 9.
Source:  UNCTAD Data Base on Trade Control Measures.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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